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CRIME CONTROL IN NEW YORK: TWO
STRATEGIES
ROBERT J. McGUIRE*
The New York City police continue to be confronted by the double
helix of severe resource limitations and expanding levels of violent felony crime.. The force is one-quarter smaller now than in 1975. In light
of this dramatic shrinkage, it is not surprising that the FBI's index of
major felony crime shows that in 1981 New York ranked twelfth on the
list of major American cities, up from eighteenth in 1975, and, with respect to the crime of robbery, New York was third in 1981, up from
fourth in 1975.1 And yet, there are almost twice as many convicts in
New York State prisons now than there were ten years ago. 2 Indeed, not
only are our jails occupied to the absolute limit of their capacity, but
every agency of our criminal justice system is strained to the margin of
its resources. During the last two years, for example, our prosecutors
have increased the felony indictment rate by almost thirty percent. 3 But
the volume of crime continues to outpace the capacity of the system to
deal with it. In this maelstrom of institutional crisis, the huge preponderance (seventy-eight percent) of felony arrests made by police erode to
misdemeanors or are dismissed outright in the arraignment and pre-indictment process.
In the face of this awful and tragic dilemma the police have
adopted two crime control stategies. One approach seeks to augment
arrest cases of career criminals. The other strategy seeks to stabilize
neighborhoods with crime deterring patrols. In 1979 the New York police and District Attorneys undertook the design, testing and implementation of felony augmentation programs.
* Police Commissioner of New York City; Master of Laws in Public and Administrative
Law, New York University, 1962; J.D., St. John's University School of Law, 1961; B.A., Iona
College, 1958.
1 NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, STATISTICAL REPORT: CRIME INDEX
TRENDS (1981).
2 NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, ANNUAL REPORT

(1981). For the first six months of 1982, however, the index felonies as a group declined by 5%
and robberies declined by 9.2%.
3 NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, ANNUAL REPORTS,
NEW YORK STATE FELONY PROCESSING (1979 & 1981).
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These felony augmentation programs are aimed at career criminals.
Given its resource crisis, the Department cannot assign detectives to
augment, or case-build, all or even most felony arrests. These arrests are
usually made, in media res, by police officers whose primary function is
not investigation, but patrol. Even if detectives could augment most
felony cases, the beleaguered prosecutors and courts could not indict
and try a substantially greater number of cases than they are now handling. And, of course, with no surplus jail space, even if the average felon,
by whatever criteria one wished to define him or her, was routinely convicted of a felony, his or her incarceration for an appreciable period of
time is not likely. The strategy of the Felony Augmentation Program,
therefore, is to strengthen cases involving criminals who, because of their
violent histories, most deserve to feel the focused and coordinated resources of both the police and the prosecutor. Through mutual definition by police and prosecutors of the target class of potential arrestees,
indictment cases can be shaped in both pre- and post-arrest status to
maximize evidentiary quality and ultimately secure more punitive
sentences in both tried and plea bargained dispositions.
The central point of this policy is that the longer habitual felons are
in prison, the fewer felonies they commit upon innocent citizens in society. The ultimate goal of the program is the strategic reduction of violent crime, over time, through the timely incarceration of persons who,
by virtue of their criminal history, will predictably commit robberies or
other crimes of violence while at liberty. Collectively, this class of career
criminals, though a relatively small percentage of the criminal population, is thought to commit a disproportionately high percentage of violent street crime. Broad research in a number of quarters has validated
this proposition. Marvin Wolfgang of the University of Pennsylvania,
for example, studied a group of 10,000 men born in Philadelphia in
1945 who, at the time of his review, had committed 10,214 reported
crimes. Slightly more than 600 (six percent) of this group had a record
of five or more crimes each, and were responsible for fifty percent of all
offenses. 4 Furthermore, the Institute for Law and Social Research concluded in a study of Manhattan offenders that about six percent of the
total offender population commits twenty-eight percent of felonies and
serious misdemeanors. According to the Institute's analysis, 3,150 career
criminals committed 107,000 of such offenses. 5 The Rand Corporation
studied a group of 624 inmates of California State prisons and found
that one-quarter of the group reported committing fifty-eight percent of
the group's armed robberies, sixty-five percent of its burglaries, and
4 Wolfgang, Crime in a Birth Cohort, 1973 ALDINE CRIME & JUST. ANN. 109.
5 INSTITUTE FOR LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY,
STRATEGY FOR PROSECUTORS
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forty-six percent of its assaults. The study also revealed that the eight
percent of the most criminally active committed over sixty crimes a
6
year.
It is surprising that New York City's criminal justice system did not
earlier seize upon this plan to focus on career criminals as the only coherent and sensible response to rising crime and diminishing resources.
Two accounts from the New York press illustrate this failure to deal
with the career criminal problem. First, an article by Barbara Basler
7
entitled, Mugger-s Tale.: He Prowled Without Fear Through a Fearful Ciy,
describes a boy named H.W. From the time H.W. was fifteen years old,
he had made hundreds of dollars a night prowling the city streets from
Times Square to the upper reaches of Park Avenue, robbing everyone
from men with attache cases to clerks in small shops. The young man
had little to fear, even though he was arrested eleven times and convicted five times. He was allowed to walk out of the court room again
and again. He made it clear that while the city feared him, he had very
little fear of the city or the massive system it had set up to deter, try and
punish him. Second, Neal Hirschfeld wrote in TurnstileJustice Aiding Subway Ciminals?,8 about A.S., one of a group of 500 offenders who City
Transit Police feel are responsible for forty percent of all subway crime.
In February, 1979 he had a record of sixty prior arrests. By October,
1980 he had been arrested nine more times. The stiffest sentence given
to him within that year and a half was ninety days.
This is the environment in which the Department's Felony Augmentation Program has been developed. In March, 1980 a pilot project
was established in Manhattan which created a special Career Criminal
Command responsible for identification of career criminals currently at
large in the community who, by virtue of their established criminal history records, were appropriate targets for the aggressive use of the concentrated resources of police and prosecutors.
The Career Criminal Command develops biographical files on individuals with serious prior robbery or violent crime histories. These files
contain up-to-date criminal history records, prior arrest reports, modus
operandi information, history of weapons use, or acts of violence and
threat utterance. Upon arrest of a target, this file is transmitted to the
District Attorney to assist in the prosecution of the current arrest, to
help the court in shaping bail decisions, and to facilitate priority handling of the case. The Command is reponsible for immediate post-arrest
6
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(1981).
7 Basler, Mugger's Tale: He Prowled Without Fear Through a Fearful City, N.Y. Times, Nov.
17, 1980, § II, at 1, col. 1.
8 Hirschfeld, TrstilejusticeAiding Subway Criminals?, N.Y. Daily News, Oct. 20, 1980.
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case building of arrested target cases, public surveillance and apprehension of selected targets, and post-arraignment investigations as needed or
when the prosecutor requests assistance.
Futhermore, the Command provides for follow-up evaluations of
the Program through routine daily interaction between the police detectives and the assistant prosecutors assigned to the Manhattan District
Attorney's Career Criminal Bureau, and, periodically, through more
formal evaluations. The effectiveness or deficiencies in the Program are
measured by the number of successful prosecutions that ensue, coupled
with meaningful periods of incarceration for those convicted.
A target list of 1,100 career criminals was established as the centerpiece of the Program. The criterion for inclusion on the list was either
two arrests for robbery or arrests for one robbery and one other violent
felony in Manhattan, within thirty-six months of each other. The age
requirement for those on the list was sixteen to thirty-five. In the event
of the routine arrest of any target by the patrol force, senior detectives
immediately assume investigative responsibility for the case. These
detectives are assigned round-the-clock at the Central Booking facility
and within an hour of the arrest are seeking more witnesses, bringing
forensic units to the scene, conducting searches, reviewing unsolved
cases in light of the target's modus operandi, transmitting his biographical file to the District Attorney and conferring with police counsel to
avoid legal flaws in the case. In addition to augmentation efforts which
are reactive to a regular patrol unit's fortuitous arrests of targets, the
Program also contains a proactive element, in that those on the list who
are most dangerous are placed under police surveillance in order to apprehend them in the act of committing a violent crime.
A conference of police executives, prosecutors and judges assessed
the results of the first nine months of the pilot project in March, 1981.
Of the 1,100 targeted individuals, fifty-nine percent had been arrested. 9
Of those cases resolved:
(1) the indictment rate was fifty-nine percent as compared to
twenty percent citywide in all felony cases;
(2) felony convictions on disposed indictments were eighty-nine
percent versus eighty percent citywide in all felony cases;
(3) there was an incarceration rate of ninety-four percent compared to seventy percent for all New York City felony cases;
(4) perhaps the most significant impact of the program is that the
felony convictions the program secured were first convictions for fifty-six
percent of the target cases, and that fifty percent of the convicted felons
9 NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, FELONY AUGMENTATION PROGRAM (1981).
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received their first jail sentence in their criminal careers.10
A criminal history review of the first 235 targets prosecuted reveals
an average of twelve previous arrests per target (seven felonies and five
misdemeanors) and an average prior conviction rate of .4 felony offenses
and four misdemeanor offenses. The aggregate amount of time served for
the average target, with twelve previous arrests, was less than three
months. In the 235 Program cases under review, the jail sentences imposed in eighty-six percent of the cases exceeded all previous combined
jail sentences imposed upon the defendant."
Based upon these preliminary findings, the Department in the fall
of 1981 established felony augmentation units in all boroughs of the
City. The Manhattan list of 1,100 has become a citywide list of almost
8,000. A computer system called C.A.T.C.H. (Computer Assisted Terminal Criminal Hunt) is programmed through a complex coding procedure to produce, from data in tens of thousands of arrest cases since
1978, patterns of behavior, crime situs, physical characteristics, type of
victims, use of accomplices and a variety of other types of relevant information. This process facilitates the linking of listed targets to pending
crime complaints where no arrests have been made.
The key criterion for inclusion on the target list remains robbery
arrests rather than robbery convictions. This will shortly change. The
New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services is working with
the Department to produce a conviction-based list. This is a complex
task. During the last ten years, 110,748 persons were arrested at least
once for robbery in New York City. Of these, 33,907 are convicted
felons who are therefore subject, by statute, to mandatory sentences of
increased severity if convicted of another felony. There are 22,108 in the
two or more robbery arrest category (the Program's criterion), and
20,380 of these are convicted felons. In this universe of robbery arrestees, there are over one thousand individuals who have been arrested
at least three times for robbery and have three or more robbery convictions. It is not yet clear how many of these potential targets are currently in prison, or in which age cohorts they are. Highly relevant
juvenile history is not included because of legal constraints. When the
target list is converted to a conviction base, potential severity of future
sentences will be substantially strengthened.
Recognizing the value of the Felony Augmentation Program, the
New York State Legislature in June 1981 provided $16 million for police
and prosecutors to begin institutionalizing such programs throughout
the State. The Manhattan pilot project demonstrates that the Felony
10 Id
ll/Id
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Augmentation Program is in theory and practice an effective operational construct for dealing with rampant violent crime in a period of
severe resource constraints. The career criminal concept, upon which
the Program is predicated, provides a viable and realistic standard
against which the police, prosecutor and judges can measure the system's crime control effectiveness.
It is not yet possible to say whether the Program will be an effective
device for the strategic reduction of crime over time. But, given the dramatically improved rate of surivorship of these felony cases as they proceed through the system, the comparatively more severe sanctions
imposed after conviction, the limitation of grade slippage in plea bargaining, and the enhanced evidentiary quality detectives in the Program
achieve, there is a clear indication that the experience of this pilot project should shape the crime control policies of the criminal justice
system.
Beyond the critical necessity of building better cases where crimes
have already been committed, the problem of how best to deploy patrol
resources to deter crime before it happens is the enduring problem for
police administrators. In 1978 the New York police established a formal
program of neighborhood stablilizing foot patrols to supplement radio
car patrols. As in most large cities, radio car patrols are dispatched by
computer when the public notifies the police of emergencies. The
Neighborhood Stabilization Units (N.S.U.'s) have reestablished visibility and human contact between officers and citizens in their homes,
shops and on the street.
The Neighborhood Stabilization Unit patrol concept was introduced in the Department on April 13, 1978. The initial intent was to
enhance the ability of the Department to prevent street crime and to
provide a high-profile uniform presence in each community of our City.
This was accomplished by the assignment of 670 re-hired police officers
and ninety precinct anti-crime officers to nineteen N.S.U.'s citywide.
Each unit was roughly congruent with and under the direction and control of borough commands. The N.S.U. officers, along with a sufficient
number of experienced supervisors, performed uniform foot patrol to accomplish the twin goals of decreasing street crime and creating an atmosphere of safety in neighborhoods throughout the City. The nineteen
new units ranged in size from nineteen to fifty-nine officers each and
covered from three to six precincts in their respective boroughs. Community and business leaders immediately hailed the program for returning preventive foot patrols to the streets of New York.
In November, 1979 the Department hired its first class of new recruits since 1975. Until 1979 all hiring had been of seasoned police officers furloughed during the fiscal crisis, and the policy of placing them
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in N.S.U.'s as replacements for incumbents posed no difficulties. With
the return to a systematic recruit hiring and training program, the
N.S.U.'s offered the Department the opportunity to provide additional
training and field experience to the student officers under controlled
conditions, while at the same time insuring these units a steady stream
of youthful and energetic members. Each graduating class bumped the
preceding class from N.S.U.'s to precinct assignment. Field Training
Officers were assigned to each unit to train and evaluate the students'
performance and probationary periods were lengthened to eighteen
months. Through these and other modifications the original N.S.U.
concept of directed foot patrol to prevent crime and provide police visibility was expanded to include that of a continuing educational experience for new officers under the watchful eye of training officers.
Currently, there are 967 recruits assigned to the N.S.U.'s under the supervision of 239 Detective Field Training Officers, each unit now ranging in size from twenty-nine to eighty-five officers.
N.S.U. patrol differs from precinct assignment in several ways. Being under the direction and control of a Zone Inspector, the units represent a highly mobile reserve, either individually or in combination,
which may be utilized to respond to emergency situations without affecting precinct operations. Since the officers are still under the direct
supervision of an experienced training officer, they gain confidence more
rapidly and mistakes are corrected on the spot. Tenure in N.S.U.'s is
strictly limited to the interim period between one graduating class and
another, providing a steady stream of officers unjaded by the routine of
patrol. The enthusiasm and trim, professional appearance of such officers create a most favorable public impression.
Productivity, as measured by the usual yardsticks of arrests, summonses and aided cases, cannot adequately reflect the total effect these
officers produce. The program emphasizes learning, crime prevention
and generating a positive feeling of security on our streets for the citizenry. The wide acceptance of these units, within and Without the Department, confirms the program's worth. The Police Academy values
the units as a superb training vehicle and patrol commanders are
pleased to have available a mobile reserve not tied directly to emergency
computer dispatched service calls. Operationally, these officers provide
the non-emergency police functions often neglected in patrol precincts
because of manpower shortages. Most importantly, these officers make
clear to the public the Department's commitment to restoring a feeling
of safety and security to all the streets of the City.
But crime on the streets of our neighborhoods can be reduced only
through a partnership of police and residents. The cruelest aspect of
urban crime is its devastating and disproportionate impact upon the
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poor and the minority citizens who are the most vulnerable, emotionally
and economically, to the social and personal disruptions of endemic
criminal behavior. A preponderance of the major offenses in our cities
occur in what we euphemistically call the "inner city."
The problem of inner city crime is graphically evident when one
looks at the geography of violent crime in New York. In 1980, the five
police precincts in the City with the highest homicide rates were located
in Bedford-Stuyvesant or its environs, Harlem and the South Bronx.
The five police precincts with the highest rates of forcible rape were
located in Bedford-Stuyvesant or its environs, the South Bronx and
South Jamaica.
Four of the five precincts with the highest felonious assault rates
were located in Bedford-Stuyvesant or its environs and the South Bronx.
The three precincts in Bedford-Stuyvesant or its environs were in second
through fourth place on the robbery list. If the two precincts in the
Times Square area are excluded as sui geners, three of the five precincts
with the highest overall felony rate covered some of the City's worst
ghetto or marginal neighborhoods. These statistics become even more
distressing when one recognizes the widespread tendency, born of despair, not to report crimes in these areas.
In Harlem's 32nd Precinct, a recent study showed that over a fiveyear period 430 men, women and children had been shot, stabbed or
beaten to death. In one twelve-month period, a single street corner,
147th Street and Eighth Avenue, was the scene of fifty shootings and
eighteen murders. The handgun, of course, is everywhere-in the hands
of children barely into their teens, under the counters of terrified grocery
and candy store owners and in the pockets and belts of gunmen who
plunder the meager resources of these neighborhoods and the marginal
lives of those who live there.
Heroin addiction is a primary scourge of these beleaguered neighborhoods, scarred by the enduring dispensations of the street pusher as
ubiquitous and regular as the gas lamp lighter of the nineteenth century, with terrible injury done to families and children in his wake. This
enemy within, this not so invisible fifth column at the street level, posted
at blazing trash baskets in the cold of winter and on any random corner
in the sunshine of summer, is the death of these communities.
Central to the success of crime control efforts is the development of
solidarity between the residents of such neighborhoods and the police
officers who patrol their streets. This is the indispendable element that
leads people to report crime when it occurs, inspires them to support the
police in the investigation and arrest of those responsible for crime, and
encourages them to be public witnesses in the prolonged proceedings
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which formally follow an arrest. More significantly, solidarity between
policeman and citizen in these precincts generates pride in the community, hope for rescue and deliverance and confident support in conditions that are sometimes terrifying and almost always depressing.
Solidarity dissipates suspicion and augments trust. It blurs racial and
social differences in the face of common danger. It enlists the best instincts of civilian and officer in the joint service of human values and
their preservation at the most fundamental level.
Survival is at stake for the people who suffer so grievously, and for
the police officer who will almost surely be fired upon by the desperate
felon seeking to make good his escape after victimizing a child, an old
woman or a shopkeeper. How truly sad it is, and indeed strange, that
such officers are often seen, and sometimes see themselves, as cadres of
occupation, conducting alien patrols in hostile environments. Under
such conditions, a garrison mentality can and does spring up, and renders hoped for solidarity between police and citizenry an illusion of good
intentions and a casualty of fear and danger. As a consequence, the
criminal becomes emboldened, racial animosities intensify and conditions in these neighborhoods worsen.
Faced with the suffering and despair of so many who have experienced violent crime, what should our policy be? Our policy, public and
private, must foster those human qualities which alone can redeem our
neighbors from the desperate condition in which they find themselves:
solidarity, courage and resourcefulness. The policeman on the beat and
the citizen on the street, or in his or her home, cannot be safe without
each other. The one cannot secure justice without the other. Each,
alone, is weak and vulnerable, but together they are a force to be reckoned with.

